A Estratégia Institucional do Supremo Tribunal Federal no Processo Legislativo

Fernando Bentes Bentes

Resumo


A Constituição Federal brasileira fixou um desenho estrutural de competências que permite uma ampla atuação do Supremo Tribunal Federal sobre a vida social e os ramos de governo. No entanto, a análise da teoria institucionalista estratégica sobre os julgados relativos ao processo legislativo federal demonstra que não há um panorama assimétrico entre os departamentos estatais. Na verdade, o jogo entre poderes pode criar cenários conjunturais que libertam decisões baseadas na preferência individual dos julgadores ou que restringem a autonomia da Corte quando críticas ou retaliações externas ameaçam sua permanência e autoridade.


Palavras-chave


Supremo Tribunal Federal; Congresso Nacional; separação de poderes; processo legislativo; institucionalismo.

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Referências


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.26668/IndexLawJournals/2526-012X/2016.v2i2.1476

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Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direito, Florianópolis (SC), e-ISSN: 2526-012X

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